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The possible commencement of negotiations on Turkey’s membership of the European 
Union has, towards the end of 2004, charged to the top of the European political agenda. 
This is an intensely contested issue, comprising many sub-themes and multiple tangents. I 
adopt the conception of a three level game1 to examine arguments, interests and influences 
circulating and interconnected to the core question of potential Turkish EU membership. 
This extends Robert Putnam’s ‘Two-Level Game’,2 represented here as activity within 
individual EU member-states (domestic level) and between EU and other states 
(international level), to include activity among EU states, institutions and other European 
actors (European level). The paper discusses economic, cultural, and security-strategic 
considerations, all of which are politicised by advocates and opponents alike. 
 
Introduction 
 
The outcome of the European Council summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 included 
the setting of a ‘date for a date’ at which a decision on commencing negotiations with 
Turkey would be made. On 17 December 2004 the Council will, following an assessment 
by the European Commission,3 undertake this. In the months before the Commission report 
appeared, politicians addressed the theme with greater frequency. Conservative circles, in 
Germany, France and Austria, in particular, sought to mobilise opposition, and governing 
parties, most pertinently in Germany, impressed support for opening negotiations.  
Considered as advocates or opponents of Turkey joining EU, the major actors are the 
German Social Democratic (SPD)-Green government, led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
                                                 
1Helmut Hubel ‘The EU’s Three-level Game in Dealing with Neighbours’ European Foreign Affairs Review 
9:3 2004 pp347-362. 
2Robert Putnam ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’ International 
Organization 42:3 1988 pp427-460. 
3European Commission Regular Report on Turkey’s Accession (COM 656 final) (Brussels: 2004). 
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and Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer; their candidate (or de facto appointee) as 
Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen; the USA, which has for several years 
provided strong backing for Turkey; the UK, which confirms the American position and in 
which both government and opposition approve of opening negotiations; and Greece, 
which until a few years ago could be expected to veto any attempt by Turkey to join the 
EU. French President Jacques Chirac has, officially, also declared his support and is a key 
figure. His position is not as certain as some of his earlier statements may have indicated.  
The principal opponents of full EU membership for Turkey are the Christian Democrat 
(CDU-CSU) parties in Germany; the French centre-right parties (and some politicians on 
the left); all Austrian parties; and several national publics wherein opposition ranges up to 
80%. Political elites in the Netherlands are dubious without such strongly adversarial 
views. Several members of the former Prodi Commission, including those who held the 
Agriculture and Competition portfolios, Franz Fischler and Frits Bolkestein, had similar 
opinions. The European Parliament, largely due to the numerical strength of the 
conservative European People’s Party, also contains a good deal of scepticism. There is 
also a neutral bloc, principally of smaller states, which will likely follow the Commission’s 
recommendation. Beyond these are amorphous, less predictable, but highly influential 
factors of terrorism and instability. 
 
Background 
 
Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and exercised an important role on the 
alliance’s southern flank during the Cold War. In this context it applied for Associate 
Membership of the then European Economic Community (EEC) and signed an agreement 
in 1963. In the next two decades Turkish foreign policy, most obviously through the 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and internal upheavals, such as the1980 military coup, often 
did not assist the objective of joining the European Community (EC), for which Turkey 
applied in 1987. By 1996 the partnership had progressed to a Customs Union. In 1997 
Turkey was rejected as a candidate for full membership by what had become the EU and 
subsequently broke off diplomatic relations. In a remarkable turnaround, Turkey was then 
accepted as candidate at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. Among other factors, this 
was influenced by the war against Serbia earlier that year and the important 
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peacemaking/keeping role had Turkey played. In December 2002 the EU locked itself into 
making a decision on membership negotiations two years hence. 
This background indicates a degree of myopia among European states and institutions 
about the likelihood of Turkish accession. For most of the period outlined it was considered 
that Turkey had not approached the requirements to join the EU, or even if it did Greece 
could be counted on to apply a veto. Concurrently, however, a sense of obligation has been 
generated. This is not of the same order as could be argued the EU had towards the peoples 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).4 It is more of an expectation on the part of Turkey, 
but one that has steadily intensified. Strong pressure applied by the USA in support of 
Turkey’s EU accession has encouraged this.  
There is another influence on why Turkey’s bid has progressed this far. In its day-to-
day business the EU’s ethos of ‘community’ and ‘solidarity’ influences voting procedures 
and outcomes. While all member-states pursue their own preferences and imperatives, none 
wants to be the sole rejecter of a proposition, particularly so for issues which have special 
impact on one current or applicant state.5 Although several may be of a negative opinion, 
veto-wielding members seek to avoid deploying theirs unless particular ‘national interests’ 
are considered vital enough and there is no apparent alternative. This might be applied to 
Turkey’s accession bid wherein behind formal exteriors in favour there is widespread 
scepticism. All states and institutions concurrently emphasise that a ‘EU perspective’ for 
Turkey is needed, to promote and sustain a reformist course. 
 
What is required of Turkey and what has it done? 
 
Before negotiations can begin any candidate for membership must fulfil the political 
Copenhagen Criteria comprising the establishment and unhindered operation of democratic 
institutions and procedures, and the implementation and assurance of EU human rights 
standards. Before a candidate can accede it must also fulfil the economic criteria: a 
functioning market economy and the capacity to withstand competition. Additionally, a 
                                                 
4Cf. Frank Schimmelfennig The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2003); Steve Wood Germany and East-Central Europe: Political, Economic and 
Socio-Cultural Relations in the Era of EU Enlargement (Aldershot: Ashgate 2004). 
5An inverse instance of this was the concerted attempt of other EU states to isolate Austria over the 
composition of its government in 2000. 
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candidate must demonstrate that it can assume the acquis communautaire and meet the 
specificities of its 31 chapters. Less accentuated is the condition that the EU itself must 
possess the ‘capacity to integrate new members’.6  
In its pursuance of these requirements, Turkey has introduced some major legal 
reforms. The system of State Security Courts has been terminated and five of the National 
Security Council’s nine members, including its chief, are now civilian. The influence of the 
military has reduced, certainly in formal terms, though how much substantially is not 
clearly quantifiable. The death penalty was abolished in the wake of EU pressure with the 
standout example being Kurdish independence fighter/terrorist, Abdullah Ocalan, who had 
his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. Minority rights have been extended and 
the over 12 million Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnicity can now experience media 
broadcasts in the Kurdish language. The legal position and protection of women has 
improved and so-called ‘honour killings’ are subject to increased scrutiny and punishment. 
 
Table 1: Political Rights and Civil Freedoms 2003/2004 
 Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Freedoms 
Together Trend Classification 
EU-15 1.0 1.0 1.0 Positive Free 
CEE Round 1 1.0 1.8 1.4 Stable Free 
CEE Round 2 1.5 2.0 1.8 Positive Free 
Turkey 3.0 4.0 3.5 Positive Partially Free 
Ukraine 4.0 4.0 4.0 Stable Partially Free 
Note: 1 represents the best and 7 the worst evaluation. 1 to 3 classified ‘free’, 3 to 5.5 ‘partly free’ and over 5.5 ‘not free’. Ratings reflect 
global events from 1 January 2003 to 30 November 2003. Source: Freedom House cited in Quaisser and Wood EU Member Turkey? 
 
The emotive issue of torture has been confronted with a ‘zero tolerance policy’. 
Nonetheless, independent agencies and the Commission itself have reported on numerous 
instances. The Turkish Human Rights Organisation stated there were around 600 in the past 
year; Hughes notes a ‘big fall in the severest forms of torture (to around 20 cases).’7 A 
                                                 
6For an extensive discussion see Wolfgang Quaisser and Steve Wood EU Member Turkey? Preconditions, 
Consequences and Integration Alternatives (München: Forost 2004). 
7Amnesty International ‘Turkey: Fear for safety/death threats/risk of torture and ill-treatment’ 44/031/2004, 4 
August 2004 and ‘Turkey: Torture and ill-treatment’ 44/030/2004, 20 July at web.amnesty.org; Andreas 
Middel ‘Foltervorwürfe überschatten Verheugens Türkei-Besuch’ Die Welt 9 September 2004 p7; ‘Die EU 
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critical question here is whether these actions did or do involve any form of systemic 
participation or neglect by state organs. In September 2004 the introduction of a new penal 
code, urged by EU states, the US and the Commission, was almost foiled. The Turkish 
government scored a political own goal when it hesitated about including adultery in the 
reform. This was incorporated, and thereby decriminalised, almost at the last minute. 
 
Table 2: Selected Indices on Socio-Political Conditions 
 Public Institution 
Index 
Contracts and Law 
Sub-index 
Corruption  
Sub-index 
 Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score 
EU-15 19 5.65 20 5.36 20 6.07 
    Finland 12 6.01 1 6.35 4 6.68 
    Greece 42 4.71 37 4.63 52 4.79 
CEEC-Round 1 40 4.85 48 4.28 36 5.46 
     Estonia 28 5.36 32 4.85 27 5.85 
     Poland 58 4.17 66 3.59 53 4.75 
CEEC-Round-2 74 3.69 87 2.84 62 4.54 
     Bulgaria 62 4.10 92 2.72 35 5.50 
     Rumania 86 3.27 83 2.97 90 3.58 
Turkey 63 4.07 52 4.03 69 4.12 
Note: For Rankings 1 = best country, 102 = worst country. Scores range from 1 (worst possible evaluation) to 7 (best possible 
evaluation). Source: World Economic Forum cited in Quaisser and Wood EU Member Turkey? 
 
The Turkish Economy 
 
An examination of the Turkish economy indicates that both the EU and Turkey would be 
confronted by huge challenges if negotiations on membership begin. Turkey’s per capita 
income is about 23% of the EU-15 and 27.5% of the EU-25 measured in Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP). In exchange rate terms it is about 12.3% and 13.8%. Even if a relatively 
successfully convergence process of 3% extra growth (above the EU-15) per year occurred, 
                                                                                                                                                    
muss der Türkei helfen’ Süddeutsche Zeitung 11-12 September 2004 p9; Kirsty Hughes Turkey and the 
European Union: Just Another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession Friends of 
Europe Working Paper (Brussels: 2004) p3. 
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it would take 50 years for Turkish and EU-15 income levels to equalise. The IMF is the 
more important institution for macro-economic assistance. Turkey is its largest debtor, 
presently in receipt of $US23 billion, approximately one quarter of the Fund’s total loans. 
Turkey has regional disparities greater than any current EU member. Around 80% of 
national wealth (value added) is produced in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and other large cities. 
The richest region has an average income of about 46% of the EU-25 average, roughly 
equivalent to Slovakia. The poorest region earns 8% of the EU-25 average. The agricultural 
sector employs about 33% of the workforce, compared with about 5% of the EU-25. This 
would represent an enormous burden on EU budgets if major reform of the CAP were not 
enforced. Turkish unemployment is currently around 11% and there is huge shadow 
economy estimated to be 30% to 100% of the ‘real economy’. Corruption is a major 
problem, though less so than in Rumania and not much worse than Poland or Greece. 
 
Chart 1: Growth and Inflation in Turkey 1981-2005 
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Source: Quaisser and Wood EU Member Turkey? (Left axis growth, right axis inflation. Changes in %) 
 
In 2003 the Turkish budget deficit was 8.8% and debt about 80% of GDP. Inflation was 
25% in 2003 and reduced to single figures in 2004. Projected growth of real GDP for 2004 
is 7% with 5% forecast for 2005. Even with relative success recently, the past two decades 
are featured by massive fluctuations. It will take some years before evidence of effective 
monetary and fiscal management and a sustainable growth path could be demonstrated. 
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Arguments for and against the opening of negotiations on Turkey’s EU Membership 
 
Apart from opposition based on Turkey not having fulfilled the political Copenhagen 
Criteria because of human rights transgressions, there are several other arguments being 
made against opening negotiations on EU membership. Firstly, opponents claim that the 
EU is already overextended. It requires all available resources and energy to successfully 
integrate the ten new member-states that joined in May 2004. Additionally, it must 
complete important ‘deepening’ projects and cope with a growing array of demands in the 
area of security and defence. This comes at a time when some member-states are having 
serious difficulties adhering to the ‘stability pact’, primarily the 3% of GDP deficit 
criterion. Continued ‘widening’ to take in new and poorer members will effectively rescind 
the goal of political union. Practical considerations are, in some instances, linked to a Euro-
idealism that perceives a Turkish entry as all but ending this ideal. 
By contrast advocates of Turkish membership claim that the EU will be enhanced 
through a resulting larger economy of scale. Turkey offers new investment opportunities 
for business, a younger labour force and has growth levels over the current EU average. 
The ‘economic potential’ that Turkey would bring to the EU is, however, hard to 
substantiate. Projections suggest Turkey’s accession would add around 0.1% to the current 
EU-25’s GDP. Certainly Turkey itself could expect a much greater boost, somewhere in the 
region of 3% to 6% per year. But clear economic benefit for the EU is not supportable. The 
Customs Union has already liberalised trade to a great extent and additional volume beyond 
that because of Turkey’s entry to the single market is presently assessed as minimal.8 
Because evidence of substantial economic gain for the present EU is sparse, arguments 
in favour of Turkey’s accession focus elsewhere, principally on the security-strategic 
dimension. With its large army and high level of defence spending Turkey could strengthen 
the EU’s nascent military component and capacity for force projection. Some claim that 
with Turkey the EU will become a global power.9 In this event, the pursuance of cohesive 
and consistent policies in the foreign, security and defence areas would not be easy. Even 
outside the EU Turkey can exert some influence on the Common Foreign and Security 
                                                 
8Quaisser and Wood EU Member Turkey? 
9Mesut Yilmaz ‘Der Eintritt der Türkei in die EU aus türkischer Sicht’ Zeitschrift für Politik 51:2 2004 
pp194-200. 
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Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Dispute over the 
EU’s use of NATO assets, which Turkey previously prevented,10 and its vetoing of 
participation by Cyprus and Malta in NATO/EU joint meetings, demonstrate that it can be 
‘extremely difficult’.11 If Turkey joins the EU the heterogeneity of interests in it will further 
increase. Future imperatives faced by Turkey and how it decides to deal with them may not 
align with some or all other members. The opposite may also apply. Though Turkey may 
add military muscle, it borders on several crisis regions. These borders - with Iraq, Iran, 
Syria and the Caucasus - will become those of the EU. 
Proponents emphasise the forty-plus year association Turkey has had with the EU and 
its predecessors and that the persistence it has shown translates into obligations. It can also 
be pointed out that others have jumped the queue. This has been noted in regard to Bulgaria 
and Rumania, vis-à-vis both of whom Turkey has several better indicators, including higher 
per capita income and in the area of contracts and law. Viewed from another angle, neither 
Bulgaria nor Rumania would be a benchmark for any form of total EU standard setting. 
The EU must also consider that if Turkey is admitted, the pressure from, and perhaps 
numbers of, other states demanding to join will increase. How could Ukraine, Moldova, 
Armenia, Belarus and even Russia then be refused if they applied and met the Copenhagen 
Criteria (unless these or the treaties are in some way modified)? 
More controversial are issues of culture, religion and identity. In the Rome Treaty of 
1957 it is stated that any ‘European state may apply to join’ the then EEC and now EU. It is 
not defined what a ‘European’ state is; that is, what cultural or geographic considerations, if 
any, may be involved. Some commentators assert that Turkey is not a European state or 
society; that its history and cultural-religious tradition and mores make it incompatible for 
full integration with the EU-25. Several notable personalities, including former French 
president, Valery Giscard d’Estaing and former German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, have 
maintained this.12 Others contend that these factors are inapplicable; they are not specified 
                                                 
10Antonio Missiroli ‘EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management: no Turkish delight for ESDP’ Security 
Dialogue 33:1 2002 pp9-26. An agreement on the use of NATO assets was later reached; see ESDP: 
Implementation of the Nice Provisions by non-EU NATO Allies (Brussels: 24-25 October 2002). 
11Interview with the author, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union, Brussels, November 2004. 
By tolerating vetoes for both states the EU maintained an unwritten rule of not isolating only one. 
12‘Europe: pour ou contre le Turquie’ Le Monde 9 November 2002; Hans Arnold Wie viel Einigung braucht 
Europa? (Düsseldorf: Droste 2004) pp138-147. 
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in the Copenhagen Criteria, which should be the sole basis of an assessment on a country’s 
readiness to begin negotiations.  
 
Regarding references to religion and geography, there is nothing that Turkey can do 
about these factors, since it cannot change its cultural identity or its geographical 
location. Such references are culturalist and any decision about Turkey and its place in 
Europe that has been taken on the basis of religion and geography would not say as 
much about Turkey as it would about the EU and a culturally essentialist orientation13 
 
This is a plausible claim. When the arguments of most proponents of Turkey’s EU 
accession are dissected, however, the critical factors used to espouse it are: geography and 
culture-religion. These are deployed in an inverted manner to support a geo-strategic 
reasoning dominated by issues of international security: terrorism and insurgency, a crisis 
region with antagonistic-unpredictable regimes, possible refugee flows, and Turkey’s 
potential role/s as a democratic model for the Muslim world or a bridge to it. Political 
actors in major EU member states, along with American diplomacy and the Commission 
have applied this. So have many scholars. According to Hughes: 
 
Turkey’s strategic geographical location, and its large Muslim population also have 
implications for the EU. It is in the EU’s strategic interests that Turkey is democratic, 
stable and prosperous and a friendly ally. Turkish EU membership can – as with 
earlier enlargements – contribute to these strategic goals.14 
 
One of Turkey’s heavyweight advocates, German Foreign Minister Fischer, took this line 
of argument to a new echelon when he declared a Turkish EU membership to be as 
important for Europe as the Normandy invasion in 1944. Fischer argued that ‘Europe needs 
to bring in Turkey and use its influence to make the country secular…Turkish membership 
was a key way to liberate Europe from the threat of insecurity from the Middle East and 
“terrorist ideas”’. Turkey’s entry would be ‘strategic in the long-term’ and that ‘to 
modernise an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would be almost a D-
                                                 
13Senem Aydin and E. Fuat Keyman European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy 
EU-Turkey Working Paper 2 (Brussels: CEPS 2004) p1. 
14Hughes ‘Turkey and the European Union’ pii. 
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Day for Europe in the war against terror…It would be the greatest positive challenge for 
these totalitarian and terrorist ideas.’15 
Geo-strategic or security factors are not specified in the Copenhagen Criteria; either as 
grounds to admit or reject a candidate. Emerson and Tocci, who also portray geography as 
a principal reason why Turkey would make a positive contribution to the CFSP/ESDP (and 
that this is then an important rationale for membership) state nonetheless: 
 
A danger would arise if, on the other hand, the Union were to accept Turkey as a full 
member on laxer conditions than those specified by the accession process. Indeed, in 
the past, conservative elements within the Turkish establishment (often spurred by the 
US) have argued that Turkey should be admitted to the Union on different conditions 
given its geo-strategic importance…Turkey’s accession in violation of EU conditions 
would set a dangerous precedent. This appears particularly relevant with regard to the 
EU’s involvement in the Middle East. Were Turkey’s own accession to be 
accomplished in violation of predetermined conditions, a bad example could be set for 
other potential candidates or close associates in the European Neighbourhood.16 
 
Is Turkey’s accession, or the promise of it, a strategic necessity? If it were, this could 
potentially overrule the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, as, for example, US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, suggested to the EU External Affairs Commissioner, 
Chris Patten, in a ‘confidential letter’ in late 2002.17 Everyone insists that a ‘EU 
perspective’ is essential though exactly what this should or must entail is disputed. For 
some NATO is sufficient to deal with security-strategic issues and could be buttressed by a 
‘privileged partnership’ between Turkey and the EU.  
For others, before all the Turkish political elite, nothing less that full EU membership is 
acceptable. Turkish diplomacy has adhered to this maximalist strategy. The Turkish 
example is a variant on a phenomenon that has proliferated in the Cold War and post-Cold 
War contexts. The West’s broader interests in stabilising Turkey lend it the motivation and 
leverage to manipulate its own actual or potential weakness to acquire political or financial 
                                                 
15Turkey EU entry as big as “D-Day”’ 20 October 2004 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/europe/3758592.stm 
16Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish 
Foreign Policy EU-Turkey Working Paper 1 (Brussels: CEPS August 2004) p9. 
17Judy Dempsey ‘US presses Brussels on Turkey’ Financial Times 12 December 2002 p1. 
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credits. Turkey’s most valuable bargaining chip is its perceived geo-strategic importance. 
For this it demands ‘strategic rents’,18 now also in the form of EU accession. Advocates 
posit it as a polity that can demonstrate the peaceful coexistence of democratic values and 
institutions with a largely Muslim society. Maintaining the feasibility of a ‘democratic 
centre’ in Turkish politics is a major objective of the EU and the US. This will remain so 
even if it means tacit collusion with a military that is still the ultimate internal arbiter. 
 
Chart 2: Turkish Political Constellation 
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Behind the arguments discussed above are also other reasons for supporting or rejecting 
Turkey as a EU member. The first is money. If eligible, Turkey stands to benefit greatly 
from generous redistributive mechanisms, before all community agricultural and structural 
policies. Many current members are averse to this prospect. According to Commission 
calculations, in a status quo scenario Turkey would be a net receiver of almost €28 billion 
(at 2004 prices) in 2025 after a nominal entry date of 2015.19 It is, however, unlikely that 
these policies and other financial aspects would not be subject to extensive reform before 
this. The EU is already overstretched in these areas and a Turkey of (then) about 80 million 
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18Soli Ozel ‘After the Tsunami’ Journal of Democracy 14:2 2003 pp80-94 
people joining an unreformed Union would precipitate a meltdown. This is at the core of 
concerns about integrative capacities in policy terms: can both the EU and Turkey cope? 
Then there is the challenge of social integration. Some resistance reflects anxieties about 
immigration, cultural compatibility and demographic trends that show the Turkish 
population increasing and that of many other EU states decreasing. 
A chief factor – some impress it as the most critical - behind Turkey’s progress this far 
is intense American pressure on EU members. Recently this has coincided with the desire 
of the US and EU to rebuild their relationship. Alignment on Turkey would take some 
attention away from the transatlantic catastrophe over Iraq and be viewed as positive. 
Reaching consensus at this international level and at the European level is hindered by 
developments at the domestic level in several EU states. Turkish EU membership is a 
partisan issue and is being exploited for electoral and other political purposes. 
 
Attitudes to and policy on Turkish EU Membership 
 
Germany 
 
Probably no state will be more affected by Turkish EU membership, or by a preceding 
debate, than Germany. In economic terms Turkey is more closely integrated with it than 
with any other EU state. 14% of Turkish imports and 16% of its exports are traded with 
Germany and about 2.5 million people of Turkish origin live there. Polls indicate, however, 
that 65% or more of the German population currently opposes a Turkish EU membership.20 
In electoral terms, citizens of Turkish origin favour the SPD and Green parties. A 
simplistic formula that it will thereby acquire an advantage provides a logic for the SPD-
Green government to support commencing membership negotiations with Turkey.21 The 
CDU-CSU opposition perceives it will gain few votes from this demographic group. It 
proposes a ‘privileged partnership’ in place of full EU membership and has organised a 
petition against this. Given the SPD-Green parties very marginal victory in the 2002 federal 
                                                                                                                                                    
19European Commission Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective (Brussels: 2004). 
20Renate Kocher ‘Beklommenheit vor dem historischen Schritt’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 21 April 
2004. 
21Andreas Wüst ‘Das Wahlverhalten eingebürgerter Personen in Deutschland’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 
B52 2003 pp29-38. Cf. Hubel ‘The EU’s Three-level Game’ pp359-360. 
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election a guaranteed bloc vote would be desirable. Yet various sources indicate that some 
SPD, and perhaps also Green voters, are among those opposed to a Turkish EU entry. They 
would vote no if there were a referendum on this. Restricting access to the German labour 
market after the 2004 enlargement was a response by the SPD to its union-worker 
constituency. The same can be expected regarding Turkey and the SPD may actually lose 
votes by supporting its EU accession. A division along party or government/opposition 
lines is also not straightforward. Prominent SPD members (Peter Glotz, Helmut Schmidt, 
Egon Bahr) are sceptical. Greens have also expressed concerns. On the other hand, some 
CDU figures, including former Defence Minister, Volker Rühe, are in favour.  
This is set against a background whereby the CDU-CSU has generally adopted the US 
lead in foreign policy issues. The SDP and Greens have somewhat less, with the most 
spectacular division being over Iraq in 2002-3. When the US attempted to ‘transform’ the 
Middle-East region the SPD-Green government, with France, opposed it.22 A year or so  
 
Figure 1: Policy Preferences/Alignments on Iraq and Turkey 
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later a neo-conservative US administration is in alignment with the same German 
government on Turkey joining the EU. The CDU-CSU, which have impressed the strategic 
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and geopolitical aspects of international relations, in a manner that usually privileges the 
US position and often criticises the SPD and/or Green view as ‘unrealistic’, now responds 
to the SPD-Green, and US, pro-Turkey position with ‘cultural’, ‘excessive financial 
burden’, and EU ‘institutional deficit’ arguments. In this regard it is allied with most of the 
French political establishment. The SPD-Greens, meanwhile, have become ‘geo-
strategists’. On these two foreign policy issues, a reversal of alignments by the German 
Left and Right with Germany’s two most important international partners has occurred. 
 
France 
 
In light of France’s European policy over the past half-century, the reasons behind 
President Chirac’s support for Turkey’s accession to the EU, to the extent of terming it 
‘irreversible’,23 are not so clear. On the surface, this will (further) dilute the French vision 
for the EU. There is little obvious benefit in the immediate or longer-term despite 
inducements in the form of Turkey’s offer to purchase Airbus planes and nuclear 
technology. On the other hand there will be more outgoings for France and less benefits for 
constituencies that have done very well from community policies, primarily agricultural 
interests. French bureaucratic predominance in Brussels, already under pressure, will 
recede further. The Turkey issue is caught up in manoeuvrings before the next presidential 
election and other internal politics. As others, most dynamically Nicholas Sarkozy, grasped 
the initiative and called for a referendum on the EU constitutional treaty and/or Turkish EU 
membership directly, Chirac has searched for an exit strategy from his declared strong 
support. A more accurate representation emerged in November with reports that a ‘special 
partnership’ or ‘fallback option’ was being considered.24 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
22Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen ‘Gulf War: The German Resistance’ Survival 45:1 2003 pp99-116. 
23‘Chirac: Weg der Türkei in die Union unumkehrbar’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30 June 2004 p2; 
‘Irreversibel und wünschenswert’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 24 September 2004 p1. 
24Daniel Dombey, John O’Doherty and Vincent Boland ‘France Urges EU ‘fallback’ on Turkey’ Financial 
Times 9 November 2004 p2. 
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Greece 
 
A long history of conflict between Greece and Turkey continued after Greece’s entry to the 
EC in 1981. Greece tried to utilise its membership to exert pressure on Turkey regarding a 
range of political and territorial issues. It was an obstructer behind whose veto others could 
hide. Although all problems are not resolved, the relationship changed dramatically after 
earthquakes hit both countries in 1999. Mutual sympathies and assistance and better 
diplomatic contacts led to a dramatic improvement in bilateral affairs. Good personal 
relations between Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Erdogan, and ‘incentives’ for both states 
from the EU and US enhanced this. Multilateral interests in resolving the Cyprus issue have 
been significant and Greece’s desire not to have the Athens Olympics overshadowed by 
disputes with Turkey may have also influenced its now consistent support. 
 
Cyprus 
 
Cyprus has been militarily divided since the Turkish invasion in 1974. Some 30,000 
Turkish troops are still in the northern part of the island, which only Turkey recognises, and 
are technically occupying a EU state. EU negotiations were made conditional on a 
resolution of the problem. Turkey has accepted a UN plan and been an accommodating 
partner but neither it nor Greece has complete control over rival ethnic factions. In 
referendums on the creation of a unified state, which would enable both regions to join the 
EU, 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour and 75% of Greek Cypriots voted against. 
Given Turkey’s concessions and the positive attitude of most Turkish Cypriots towards 
reunification and collective EU membership, the Greek Cypriots are now generally 
considered as the main hindrance to a solution. 
 
Austria 
 
After Greece’s shift from disapproval of Turkey joining the EU, Austria has signalled that 
it may assume a blocking role. The governing conservative ÖVP, the opposition SPÖ, the 
FPÖ and up to 80% of the population oppose Turkey’s membership. Diplomatic circles, 
think-tanks and other opinion-shapers are also sceptical. Contrary to the rest of his party, 
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Jörg Haider supports an entry of Turkey to the EU, and is one of few prominent figures that 
do. Although many expect that Chancellor Schüssel will avoid being the single voice to 
officially oppose Turkey, Austria may yet vote no. Schüssel’s appointment as coordinator 
of the European Peoples Party’s position probably increased the chances of this happening. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
For the UK, promoting Turkish entry maintains political and strategic alignment with the 
US, especially in the context of the battle against terrorism. It also supports the view that 
the UK prefers to extend rather than deepen the EU. On the other hand, it would be among 
the net-payers from who more would be required to fund the large net-receiver Turkey and 
might also face some immigration pressure. For the Blair government these considerations 
are outweighed by other factors. In November 2003, Foreign Minister Jack Straw declared 
Turkey should join the EU ‘as soon as possible’ and termed it a ‘great democracy’. In May 
2004 Tony Blair made the first visit to Turkey by a British Prime Minister in 14 years, 
during which he and Erdogan launched a bilateral ‘action plan’ of cooperation.25 
 
United States 
 
American flexibility of interpretation in foreign affairs is reflected in the different mental 
maps - security, economic, cultural, religious, geographic, and political – it has of 
Europe.26. Presently, US interests require that Turkey be given a definitive EU perspective 
with a clear promise of accession. It is assessed as a ‘purely strategic issue’27 wherein the 
formula reads: geography + religion + terrorism. The US promotes the concept of Turkey 
as a ‘model’ for the Islamic world to which it can (in the interim) exercise a ‘bridge’ 
function. A stable Turkey also logistically assists American objectives in the region. 
While the US is a critical ‘external’ actor influencing Turkey-EU relations, whether 
Turkey does or does not join the EU has, in contrast to the situation faced by European 
                                                 
25‘Solidarität mit Ankara: “EU-Beitritt so schnell wie möglich”’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 22 
November 2003 p1; Vincent Boland and Ben Hall ‘Blair Challenges Countries Opposed to Turkey’s 
Membership of EU’ Financial Times 18 May 2004. 
26Martin Walker “Variable Geography: America’s Mental Maps of a Greater Europe” International Affairs 
76:3 2003 pp459-474. 
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policy-makers, no resonance domestically. The US must not pay for Turkey’s EU 
membership, there is only minor knowledge or interest among the population or business, it 
plays scarcely any role in American political debate, and normative considerations carry 
minimal weight. On the other hand, if Turkey has no (current or potential) effect on the US 
internally, why such stress on the security aspects related to its EU accession? Some 
observers assert that Turkey’s entry is one means by which the US wants to weaken the 
political unity of the EU. Given their close strategic relationship, and a political 
sponsorship of Turkey’s bid for accession, if this occurs it will mean more US influence in 
Europe. Although they experienced serious tensions over Iraq, the US is Turkey’s most 
critical international ally. One analyst observed that when Turkish diplomats discussed 
foreign policy matters it was almost as if the Americans were in the room with them.28 
 
Turkey 
 
Although Turkey has been undergoing a process of ‘Westernisation’ for eighty or even two 
hundred years, an extensive reform agenda began after the economic crisis of 2001. It 
coincided with a radical transformation in the global security situation. The AKP (Justice 
and Development Party) has focused determinedly on a goal of EU accession backed by a 
‘convergence in favour’ by ‘almost all sections of Turkish society’. According to one 
observer, ‘the vast majority of Turkey’s population has appropriated the culture of 
democracy. The “mentality revolution” needed for the full implementation of democratic 
reforms, concerns not the Turkish society but the state and the bureaucracy.’29 Whatever 
direction Prime Minister Erdogan pursues he has to deal with opponents on the immoderate 
Muslim and military-secular sides of politics that EU politicians do not.30 While a majority 
are in favour of joining the EU, there is an internal debate ‘on the concessions that will 
have to be made by Turkey’, and that there will be ‘losers as well as winners’. This means 
that the EU has ‘become a convenient “scapegoat” for Turkish politicians’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
27Interview with the author, US Consulate, Munich, August 2004. 
28Conversation with the author, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, September 2004. 
29Sahin Alpay ‘Can Turkey Digest Reforms?’ Zaman Daily 9 July 2004 at 
http://www.zaman.org/?bl=columnists&trh=20040925&hn=10209 
30David L Phillips ‘Turkey’s Dreams of Accession’ Foreign Affairs 83:5 2004 pp 86-97. 
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enabling them to shift the blame for the negative consequences of reform by claiming 
that these were forced upon Turkey by EU membership requirements…the period 
since the beginning of candidacy status has seen a marked politicization of the debate 
on Turkish EU membership, not so much about whether or not the country should join 
per se but more concerning the actual terms of accession.31 
 
The domestic political discussion occurs within a regional environment containing 
neighbours that are not especially friendly. The Turkish military and its American allies, in 
particular, are attentive to the prospect of one or more of these neighbours exploiting any 
weaknesses in the Turkish political system. 
 
EU Institutions 
 
Formally the European Commission is a technocratic, ‘non-political’ actor concerned 
largely with research, management and advisory tasks. Enlargement Commissioner 
Verheugen stated that ‘The task of the Commission is restricted to determining whether 
Turkey fulfils the political conditions for the commencement of negotiations’.32 He tested 
the boundaries implied here, as political aspects of his role were impressed. His views 
contrasted sharply with other opinions in the institution where five or six Commissioners 
had misgivings about presenting a positive recommendation. The European Parliament, on 
the other hand, is a designated political forum, one whose members are keen to acquire 
more status and power in the European context. Through declarations and other lobbying 
various groups attempted to influence the outcome on 17 December.33 The Council will 
then take the next major decision when all 25 states must approve, and later ratify the 
subsequent treaty, before negotiations with Turkey can commence. Within several states 
there is aversion to this among the population and political elite.  
                                                 
31Gamze Avic ‘Turkey’s Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-
skepticism?’ Turkish Studies 3:1 2003 pp149-170, p157. 
32‘Neue Debatte über EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10 April 2004 pp1-2 
33Emma Bonino, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Bronislaw Geremek, João de Deus Pinheiro and Michel Rocard 
‘Written Declaration on the decision to be taken by the European Council in December 2004 on the opening 
of negotiations with Turkey’ Doc 40/2004 (European Parliament: 13 October 2004); Committee on Foreign 
Affairs ‘Draft Report on the 2004 regular report and the recommendation of the European Commission on 
Turkey's progress towards accession’ Doc 2004/2182 (INI) (European Parliament: 21 October 2004) 
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Apart from political parties, publics and European institutions, several media outlets 
have engaged themselves, some in a partisan fashion. The most conspicuously opposed to 
opening negotiations with Turkey is the Berlin daily newspaper, Die Welt. Less overt, but 
also sceptical, is the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. British and American publications 
such as the Economist,34 Financial Times and Wall Street Journal are supportive. 
 
Possible Outcomes 
 
A range of possible scenarios are linked to the theme of Turkish EU accession. The 
decision made by the European Council on 17 December 2004 may not be a definitive 
path-determining conclusion. Briefly, some of these potential outcomes include, firstly, that 
Turkey is accepted as candidate by the Council and the negotiation process, in concert with 
an internal reform agenda, proceeds relatively smoothly; secondly, Turkey is accepted and 
the negotiation process is protracted, perhaps as a deliberate strategy on the part of the EU; 
thirdly, Turkey is accepted but difficulties in adaptation or political problems emerge and 
the negotiation process is suspended; fourth, one (or more) member state rejects Turkey’s 
candidature; fifth, the European Parliament rejects Turkey; sixth, the public in one or more 
EU states reject Turkey’s accession in a referendum; if scenarios four, five or six, or even 
three, occur Turkey may turn away from the EU. What could happen then is entirely open. 
A seventh possibility is that Turkey ends up with some form of ‘privileged partnership’ or 
‘Extended Associate Membership’.35 
 
Conclusions 
 
Turkey’s bid to join the EU entwines at least three levels of politics. It comprises many 
competing interests and potential veto players and has also resulted in new, if temporary 
political alliances. Apart from states and international institutions, transnational lobbies and 
networks are involved. The ‘geopolitical’ or ‘security’ argument supports commencing 
negotiations with Turkey. It corresponds to the international level and has held prominence 
                                                 
34‘Why Europe must say yes to Turkey’ and ‘The impossibility of saying no’ The Economist 18 September 
2004 p13 and pp32-34. 
35Quaisser and Wood EU Member Turkey? 
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for much of the period since Turkey became a candidate in 1999. In recent months 
mobilisation against Turkey’s accession has accelerated and political, intellectual, media 
and social forces have exerted a stronger counter influence from the domestic level within 
several member states. The European level, at which, in theory, the ultimate decisions will 
be taken, was wedged between vigorous pressures from the international, primarily in 
favour of Turkish EU accession, and the domestic, primarily opposed. 
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